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PARADOXES OF FAIR DIVISION* 
P aradoxes, if they do not define a field, render its problems 
intriguing and often perplexing, especially insofar as the par- 
adoxes remain unresolved. Voting theory, for example, has 
been greatly stimulated by the Condorcet paradox, which is the 
discovery by the Marquis de Condorcet' that there may be no alter- 
native that is preferred by a majority to every other alternative, 
producing so-called cyclical majorities. Its modern extension and 
generalization is Arrow's2 theorem, which says, roughly speaking, that 
a certain set of reasonable conditions for aggregating individuals' 
preferences into some social choice are inconsistent. 
In the last fifty years, hundreds of books and thousands of articles 
have been written about these and related social-choice paradoxes 
and theorems, as well as their ramifications for voting and democracy. 
Hannu Nurmi3 provides a good survey and classification of voting 
paradoxes and also offers advice on "how to deal with them." 
There is also an enormous literature on fairness, justice, and 
equality, and numerous suggestions on how to rectify the absence of 
these properties or attenuate their erosion. But paradoxes do not 
frame the study of fairness in the same way they have inspired 
social-choice theory. 
To be sure, the notion thatjustice and order may be incompatible, 
or that maximin justice in John Rawls's4 sense undercuts the motiva- 
tion of individuals to strive to do their best, underscores the possible 
trade-offs in making societies more just or egalitarian. For example, 
an egalitarian society may require strictures on free choice to ward off 
anarchy; rewarding the worst-off members of a society may deaden 
competition among the most able if their added value is siphoned off 
to others. 
Obstacles like these which stand in the way of creating ajust society 
are hardly surprising. They are not paradoxes in the strong sense of 
* Brams acknowledges the support of the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Eco- 
nomics at New York University. Research by Edelman was done while he was in the 
School of Mathematics, University of Minnesota. We thank Dorothea Herreiner for 
valuable comments. 
1 Essai sur l'alpplication de l'analyse di la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralitW des 
voix (Paris: De L'Imprimerie royale,1785). 
2 KennethJ. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale, 1951; 21d 
ed., 1963). 
3 Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them (Berlin: Springer, 1999). 
4 A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1971). 
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constituting a logical contradiction between equally valid principles. 
Here we use paradox in a weaker sense-as a conflict among fairness 
conditions that one might expect to be compatible. Because we are 
surprised to discover this conflict, it is "nonobvious," as one of us 
labeled a collection of paradoxes he assembled about politics.5 
The fair-division paradoxes we present here all concern how to 
divide up a set of indivisible items among two or more players. In 
some paradoxes, we assume the players can do no more than rank the 
items from best to worst; in others, we assume they can, in addition, 
indicate preferences over subsets, or packages, of items. While our 
framework is generally an ordinalist one, we do admit one cardinal- 
ization of ranks, based on the Borda count used in voting, to facilitate 
certain comparisons, particularly those involving allocations with dif- 
ferent numbers of items. 
The main criteria we invoke are efficiency (there is no other division 
better for everybody, or better for some players and not worse for the 
others) and envy-freeness (each player likes her allocation at least as 
much as those which the other players receive, so she does not envy 
anybody else). But because efficiency, by itself, is not a criterion of 
fairness (an efficient allocation could be one in which one player gets 
everything and the others nothing), we also consider other criteria of 
fairness besides envy-freeness, including two different measures of 
how a worst-off player fares (maximin and Borda maximin), which we 
contrast with a utilitarian notion of overall welfare (Borda total 
score). What we rule out, besides the splitting of items, is the possi- 
bility of randomizing among different allocations, which is another 
way that has been proposed for "smoothing out" inequalities caused 
by the indivisibility of items.6 
5 Brams, Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science 
(New York: Free Press, 1976); see also Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Voting," American 
Political Science ReviezV, LXVIII, 2 (June 1974): 537-46, and Fishburn and Brams, 
"Paradoxes of Preferential Voting," Mathematics Magazine, LVI, 4 (September 1983): 
207-1 4. 
6 Fair-division procedures that allow for the splitting of (divisible) goods or the 
sharing of (indivisible) goods-possibly based on a randomization process that 
determines time shares-are discussed in, among other places, John Broome, 
Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); H. 
Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (Princeton: University Press, 1994); 
Herv6 Moulin, Cooperative Economics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction (Princeton: Uni- 
versity Press, 1995); Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to 
Dispute Resolution (New York: Cambridge, 1996);Jack Robertson and William Webb, 
Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You Can (Natick, MA: A. K. Peters, 1998); and 
Brams and Taylor, The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Eveiybody (New 
York: Norton, 1999). 
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Our paradoxes demonstrate the opportunities as well as the limi- 
tations of fair division. Thus, for example, while the only division of 
items in which one player never envies the allocation of another may 
be nonexistent or inefficient, we note that there is always an efficient 
and envy-free division for two players-even when they rank all items 
the same-as long as they do not rank all subsets of items the same. 
We also show that fair division may entail an unequal division of the 
items. 
We divide the paradoxes into three categories: 
(1) The conflict between efficiency and envy-freeness (paradoxes 1 
and 2). 
(2) The failure of a unique efficient and envy-free division to satisfy 
other criteria (paradoxes 3 and 4). 
(3) The desirability, on occasion, of dividing items unequally (para- 
doxes 5, 6, 7, 8). 
While the paradoxes highlight difficulties in creating "fair shares" 
for everybody, they by no means render the task impossible. Rather, 
they show how dependent fair division is on the fairness criteria one 
deems important and the trade-offs one considers acceptable. Put 
another way, achieving fairness requires some consensus on the 
ground rules (that is, criteria) and some delicacy in applying them 
(to facilitate trade-offs when the criteria conflict). 
We mention three technical points before we proceed to specific 
examples. First, we assume that players cannot compensate each 
other with side payments-the division is only of the indivisible items. 
Second, all players have positive values for every item. Third, a player 
prefers one set S of items to a different set T if (i) S has as many items 
as Tand (ii) for every item t in Tand not in S, there is a distinct item 
s in S and not T that the player prefers to t. For example, if a player 
ranks items 1 through 4 in order of decreasing preference 1234, we 
assume that she prefers 
* the set {1,2} to {2,3}, because {1} is preferred to {3}, and 
* the set {1,3} to {2,4}, because {1} is preferred to {21 and {3} is preferred 
to {4} 
whereas the comparison between sets 11,41 and {2,3} could go either 
way. 
I. EFFICIENCY AND ENVY-FREENESS: THEY MAY BE INCOMPATIBLE 
Paradox 1: a unique envy-free division may be inefficient. Suppose there is 
a set of three players, {A, B, Ct, that must divide a set of six indivisible 
items, 11, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61. Assume the players strictly rank the items from 
best to worst as follows: 
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Example I: 
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
B: 4 3 2 1 5 6 
C: 5 1 2 6 3 4 
The unique envy-free allocation to (A, B, C) is ({1,3}, {2,4}, {5,6}), or for 
simplicity (13, 24, 56), whereby A and B get their best and third-best 
items, and C gets her best and fourth-best items. Clearly, A prefers her 
allocation to that of B (which are A's second-best and fourth-best 
items) and that of C (which are A's two worst items). Likewise, B and 
C prefer their allocations to those of the other two players. Conse- 
quently, the division (13, 24, 56) is envy-free: all players prefer their 
allocations to those of the other two players, so no player is envious 
of any other. 
Compare this division with (12, 34, 56), whereby A and B receive 
their two best items, and C receives, as before, her best and fourth- 
best items. This division Pareto-dominates (13, 24, 56), because two of 
the three players (A and B) prefer the former allocation, whereas 
both allocations give player C the same two items (56). 
It is easy to see that (12, 34, 56) is Pareto-optimal, or efficient: no 
player can do better with some other division without some other 
player or players doing worse. This is apparent from the fact that the 
only way A or B, who get their two best items, can do better is to 
receive an additional item from one of the two other players- 
assuming all items have some positive value for the players-but this 
will necessarily hurt the player who then receives fewer than her 
present two items. Whereas C can do better without receiving a third 
item if she receives item 1 or 2 in place of item 6, this substitution 
would necessarily hurt A, which will do worse if she receives item 6 for 
item 1 or 2. 
The problem with efficient allocation (12, 34, 56) is that it is not 
assuredly envy-free. In particular, C will envy A's allocation of 12 
(second-best and third-best items for C) if she prefers these two items 
to her present allocation of 56 (best and fourth-best items for C). In 
the absence of information about C's preferences for subsets of items, 
therefore, we cannot say that efficient allocation (12, 34, 56) is 
envy-free.7 
7 Henceforth we shall mean by 'envy-free' a division such that, no matter how the 
players value subsets of items consistent with their rankings, no player prefers any 
other player's allocation to her own. If a division is not envy-free, we call it 
envy-possible if a player's allocation may make her envious of another player, depend- 
ing on how she values subsets of items, as illustrated by division (12, 34, 56) in the 
text. It is envy-ensuring if it causes envy, independent of how the players value subsets 
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But the real bite of paradox 1 stems from the fact that not only is 
inefficient division (13, 24, 56) envy-free, but it is uniquely so-there 
is no other division, including an efficient one, that guarantees 
envy-freeness. To show this in example I, note first that an envy-free 
division must give each player her best item; if not, then a player 
might prefer a division, like envy-free division (13, 24, 56) or efficient 
division (12, 34, 56), that does give each player her best item, ren- 
dering the division that does not envy-possible or envy-ensuring. 
Second, even if each player receives her best item, this allocation 
cannot be the only item she receives, because then the player might 
envy any player that receives two or more items, whatever these 
items are. 
By this reasoning, then, the only possible envy-free divisions in 
example I are those in which each player receives two items, includ- 
ing her top choice. It is easy to check that no efficient division is 
envy-free.8 Similarly, one can check that no inefficient division, ex- 
cept (13, 24, 56) that gives each player two items-including her 
best-is envy-free, making this division uniquely envy-free. 
Paradox 2: there may be no envy-free division, even when all players have 
different preference rankings. While it is bad enough when the only 
envy-free division is inefficient (paradox 1), it seems even worse when 
there is no envy-free division. This is trivial to show when players rank 
items the same. For example, if two players both prefer item I to item 
2, then the player that gets item 2 will envy the player that gets 
item 1. 
In the following example, each of three players has a different 
ranking of three items: 
Example II: 
A: 1 2 3 
B: 1 3 2 
C: 2 1 3 
There are three divisions, in which each player gets exactly one item, 
which are efficient-(1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3), and (3, 1, 2)-in each of 
which at least one player gets her best item. It is evident that none is 
of items. In effect, a division that is envy-possible has the potential to cause envy. By 
comparison, an envy-ensuring division always causes envy, and an envy-free division 
never causes envy. 
8 We previously showed that division (12, 34, 56) is not envy-free. As another 
example, consider efficient division (16, 34, 25). Whereas neither B nor C envies 
each other or A, A might prefer either B's 34 or C's 25 allocations, making this 
division envy-possible. 
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envy-free, because the player that gets item 1 in each (A or B) will be 
envied by at least one of the other two players. For instance, in the 
case of the division (2, 1, 3), both A and C will envy B. 
Can an inefficient division be envy-free, as was the case in example 
I? It is not hard to see that this situation cannot occur in example II 
for the reason given above: the player that gets item 1 will be envied. 
But in the case of an inefficient division, "trading up to efficiency" 
reduces the amount of envy. For example, consider inefficient division 
(2, 3, 1), in which each player receives her second-best choice. 
Because A envies C, B envies C, and C envies A, a trade of items 1 and 
2 between A and C is possible. It yields efficient division (1, 3, 2), in 
which only B envies A. 
Besides (2, 3, 1), the other two inefficient divisions-(1, 2, 3) and 
(3, 2, 1)-also allow for trading up to efficiency. In the first, a trade 
of items 2 and 3 between B and Cyields efficient division (1, 3, 2); in 
the second, a trade of items 1 and 2 between B and C yields efficient 
division (3, 1, 2). Three-way trades are also possible. For instance, 
starting from inefficient division (3, 2, 1), a three-way trade, whereby 
A sends item 3 to B, B sends item 2 to C, and C sends item 1 to A, 
yields efficient division (1, 3, 2). 
Trading up to efficiency is also possible in example I: by exchang- 
ing items 2 and 3, A and B can turn inefficient division (13, 24, 56) 
into efficient division (12, 34, 56). As in example II, however, no 
efficient division is envy-free in example I. The difference between 
examples I and II is that example II does not admit even an ineffi- 
cient envy-free division. 
II. UNIQUE EFFICIENT AND ENVY-FREE DIVISIONS: THEIR 
INCOMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER CRITIERIA 
Paradox 3: a unique efficient and envy-free division may lose in voting to an 
efficient and envy-possible division. So far we have shown that efficiency 
and envy-freeness may part company either by there being no envy- 
free division that is also efficient (example I), or no envy-free division 
at all (example II). But when these properties coincide, and there is 
both an efficient and an envy-free division, it may not be the choice 
of a majority of players, as illustrated by the following example: 
Example III: 
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
B: 5 6 2 1 4 3 
C: 3 6 5 4 1 2 
There are three efficient divisions in which (A, B, C) each get two 
items: (12, 56, 34); (12, 45, 36); and (14, 25, 36). But only the third 
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division, (14, 25, 36), is envy-free. Whereas C might prefer B's 56 
allocation in the first division, and B might prefer A's 12 allocation in 
the second division, no player prefers another player's allocation in 
(14, 25, 36). 
But observe that both A and B prefer the first division, (12, 56, 34), 
to the envy-free third division, (14, 25, 36), because they get their top 
two items in the first division; only C gets her top two items in (14, 25, 
36). Hence, the first division would defeat the envy-free third division, 
(14, 25, 36), by simple majority rule. 
The situation is not so clear-cut when we compare the second 
division, (12, 45, 36), with the envy-free (14, 25, 36). In fact, there 
would be a tie vote: C would be indifferent, because she gets her top 
two items, 36, in each division; A would prefer the second division 
(top two items versus best and fourth-best items); and B would prefer 
the envy-free division, (14, 25, 36) (best and third-best items versus 
best and fifth-best items). 
Thus, if there were a vote, the unique envy-free division, (14, 25, 
36), would lose to the envy-possible division, (12, 56, 34), and it would 
tie with the other envy-possible division, (12, 45, 36). If there were 
"approval voting,"9 and A, B, and C voted only for the divisions that 
give each player her two best items, then the envy-free division, (14, 
25, 36), would get 1 vote, compared to 2 votes each for both of the 
envy-possible divisions, (12, 56, 34) and (12, 45, 36). In sum, players 
will choose an envy-possible over the unique envy-free division, (14, 
25, 36), in either pairwise comparisons or approval voting. 
Paradox 4: neither the Rawlsian maximin criterion nor the Borda total- 
score criterion may choose a unique efficient and envy-free division. Besides 
using voting to select an efficient division, consider the following 
Rawlsian maximin criterion to distinguish among efficient divisions: 
choose the division that maximizes the minimum rank of items that 
players receive, making a worst-off player as well off as possible. To 
illustrate in example III, envy-possible division (12, 45, 36) gives a 
fifth-best item to B, whereas each of the two other efficient divisions 
gives a player, at worst, a fourth-best item. Between the latter two 
divisions, the envy-possible division, (12, 56, 34) is, arguably, better 
than the envy-free division, (14, 25, 36), because it gives the other two 
players-those which do not get a fourth-best item-their two best 
9 Under approval voting, voters can vote for as many alternatives as they like; each 
alternative approved of receives one vote, and the alternative with the most votes 
wins. See Brains and Fishburn, Approval Voting (Boston: Birkhduser, 1983). 
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items, whereas envy-free division (14, 25, 36) does not give B her two 
best items.10 
A modified Borda count would also give the nod to the envy- 
possible division, (12, 56, 34), compared not only with the envy-free 
division, (14, 25, 36), but also with the other envy-possible division, 
(12, 45, 36). Awarding 6 points for obtaining a best item, 5 points for 
obtaining a second-best item,..., 1 point for obtaining a worst item in 
example III, the latter two divisions give the players a total of 30 
points, whereas envy-possible division (12, 56, 34) gives the players a 
total of 31 points,1" which we call their Borda total scores and use as a 
measure of the overall utility or welfare of the players. Hence an 
envy-possible division beats the unique envy-free division, based on 
both the maximin criterion and the Borda total-score criterion. (We 
shall later apply the Borda count to individual players, asking what 
division maximizes the minimum Borda score that any player re- 
ceives.) 
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF UNEQUAL DIVISIONS (SOMETIMES) 
Paradox 5: an unequal division of items may be preferred by all players to an 
equal division. In section II, we showed that neither (i) pairwise 
comparison voting or approval voting (paradox 3), nor (ii) the 
maximin criterion or the Borda total-score criterion (paradox 4), 
always selects a unique efficient and envy-free division. In the follow- 
ing example, there is also a unique efficient and envy-free divi- 
sion-in which all players receive the same number of items 
(henceforth called an equal division)-but there may be grounds for 
choosing an efficient but unequal envy-possible division: 
Example IV: 
A: 1 2 3 4 
B: 2 3 4 1 
10 This might be considered a second-order application of the maximin criterion: 
if, for two divisions, players rank the worst item any player receives the same, 
consider the player that receives a next-worst item in each, and choose the division 
in which this item is ranked higher. This is an example of a lexicographic decision rule, 
whereby alternatives are ordered on the basis of a most important criterion; if that 
is not determinative, a next-most important criterion is invoked, and so on, to 
narrow down the set of feasible alternatives. 
11 The standard scoring rules for the Borda count in this 6-item example would 
give 5 points to a best item, 4 points to a second-best item,..., 0 points to a worst 
item. We depart slightly from this standard scoring rule to ensure that each player 
obtains some positive value for all items, including her worst choice, as assumed 
earlier. 
This content downloaded from 129.59.110.106 on Thu, 20 Mar 2014 15:57:07 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
308 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
It is not difficult to show that (13, 24) is the only efficient and 
envy-free division. Two other equal divisions, (12, 34) and (14, 23), 
while better for one player and worse for the other, are envy-possible. 
The above three equal divisions all give Borda total scores of 12 to 
their players. If we eliminate the envy-possible division, (14, 23), on 
the grounds that it fails the maximin criterion by giving A her worst 
item (item 4), then the comparison reduces to that between envy-free 
division, (13, 24), and envy-possible division, (12, 34). 
Curiously, it is possible that both A and B prefer the unequal 
envy-possible division, (134, 2), to the equal envy-possible division, 
(12, 34).12 Thus, unequal divisions might actually be better for all 
players than equal divisions. 
Ruling out equal division (12, 34) in such a situation, let us 
compare (134, 2) with the envy-free (equal) division (13, 24). Clearly, 
(134, 2) is better than (13, 24) for A, but it is worse for B. 
This leaves open the question of which of these two divisions, 
involving an equal and an unequal division of the items, comes closer 
to giving the two players "fair shares." As the next paradox shows, an 
unequal division may actually be more egalitarian-as measured by 
Borda scores for individual players-than an equal division. 
Paradox 6: an unequal division of items may (i) maximize the minimum 
Borda scores of players (Borda maximin) and (ii) maximize the sum of Borda 
scores (Borda maxsum). In paradox 5, we showed that an unequal but 
envy-possible division of items may compare favorably with an equal 
and envy-free division. To make this kind of comparison more pre- 
cise, consider the following example: 
Example V: 
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
B: 3 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 
C: 4 1 2 3 6 5 7 8 9 
There are exactly two unequal divisions, (12, 357, 4689) and (12, 
3589, 467), that maximize the minimum Borda scores of players, 
which are [17, 17, 17] for both divisions.13 On the other hand, there 
are two equal divisions, (129, 357, 468) and (129, 358, 467), that 
maximize the minimum Borda scores of players, which are [18, 17, 
16] for the first division and [18, 16, 17] for the second division. 
These are all the divisions whose Borda total scores are 51, which, it 
12 This is true if A prefers 34 to 2, and B prefers 2 to 34. 
3Henceforth we shall indicate the Borda scores of players [in brackets] to 
distinguish them from item allocations (in parentheses). 
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can be shown, is the maximal sum, or Borda maxsum, among all 
possible divisions (equal or unequal). 
Notice that the worst-off player in the two unequal divisions garners 
17 points (so does the best-off player, because the Borda scores of all 
players are the same), whereas the worst-off player in the two equal 
divisions receives fewer points (16). By the maximin criterion, but 
now based on Borda scores, the unequal divisions are more egalitar- 
ian. We call this the Borda maximin criterion, which is especially useful 
in comparing equal and unequal divisions.'4 
None of the four equal or unequal divisions is envy-free-all are 
envy-possible or envy-ensuring. Likewise, all four divisions are "effi- 
cient-possible" in the sense that there may be a more efficient divi- 
sion, but this is not guaranteed. Take, for example, the unequal 
division (12, 357, 4689). B or C might prefer A's 12 allocation, just as 
A might prefer B's or C's allocation, so a trade could make two, or 
even all three, players better off. Unlike our previous examples, in 
which divisions called "efficient" were all "efficient-ensuring" (that is, 
there were no trades that could improve the lot of all traders, however 
players valued subsets of items), this is not the case in example V. 
The Borda maximin criterion seems a reasonable one to distin- 
guish among all efficient-possible and envy-possible divisions. In ex- 
ample V, it is not only unequal divisions that do best on this criterion, 
but these divisions are also Borda maxsum, making them both fair 
and utility-maximizing (according to the Borda cardinalization of 
utility-more on its limitations, illustrated in example VII, later). 
Paradox 7: an unequal division of items may be Borda maxsum but not 
Borda maximin. There was no conflict between Borda maxsum and 
Borda maximin in example V-two unequal divisions satisfied both 
these properties. But as the next example illustrates, this need not be 
the case: 
Example VI: 
A: 1 2 3 
B: 1 3 2 
14 To see why, consider the two unequal divisions in example IV in which no 
player receives a fourth-best item: (1, 234) and (123, 4). To call these divisions 
maximin-like equal division (13, 24), in which no player receives a fourth-best 
item as well-seems highly questionable, because the player receiving her top three 
items in these two divisions can hardly be considered worse off (because she 
receives a third-best item) than the player receiving only her top item. Indeed, the 
Borda scores of the players in the two unequal divisions, [4, 9] and [9, 2], reveal 
how inegalitarian these divisions are, particularly when compared with equal Borda 
maximin division (13, 24) with Borda scores of [6, 6]. 
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There are two unequal maxsum divisions, (12, 3) and (2, 13), 
whose Borda scores are, respectively, [5, 2] and [2, 5]. Each gives a 
Borda total score of 7, and a minimum Borda score of 2 for a player. 
By contrast, there are two Borda maximin divisions, (1, 23) and 
(23, 1), both of which give Borda scores of [3, 3]. While they give the 
players a lower Borda total score (6) than the Borda maxsum divi- 
sions, they give the players a higher minimum score of 3. 
Presumably, the egalitarian would choose one of the two Borda 
maximin divisions, whereas the utilitarian would choose one of the 
two Borda maxsum divisions. Because there are an odd number of 
items to divide in example VI, all the divisions between A and B are 
necessarily unequal. But both Borda maximin divisions and Borda 
maxsum divisions can be the either equal (unlike example VI, the 
Borda maximin division in example IV is equal, as discussed in 
footnote 14) or unequal (two of the Borda maxsum divisions in 
example V are equal and two are unequal). It also turns out that 
Borda maxsum and Borda maximin scores can be arbitrarily far 
apart. 15 
We believe that when Borda maximin and Borda total scores 
choose different divisions, Borda maximin generally gives the fairer 
division by guaranteeing that the Borda score of the worst-off player 
is as great as possible.16 As we shall show in our final paradox, 
however, a Borda maximin division may be quite implausible, de- 
pending on how players value subsets; or it may not be envy-free 
when, at the same time, there exists an envy-free division that is 
neither maximin nor Borda maximin. 
Paradox 8: if there are envy-free divisions, none may be maximin or Borda 
maximin. In the following example, there are two players but an odd 
number of items, so no equal division of the items is possible: 
Example VII: 
A: 1 2345 
B: 1 2345 
15 Brams, Edelman, and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items" (unpub- 
lished). 
1'6To be sure, assuming that the differences in ranks are all equal, as Borda 
scoring does, is a simplification. If cardinal utilities could be elicited that reflect the 
players' intensities of preference, then these utilities-instead of the rank scores- 
could be used to equalize, insofar as possible, players' satisfaction with a division of 
the items. For fair-division bidding schemes that incorporate cardinal information, 
see Brams and Taylor, Fair Division and The Win-Win Solution; Brams and D. Marc 
Kilgour, "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy, cix, 2 (April 2001): 
418-43; and Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G. Raith, and Francis E. Su, "Bidding for 
Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems," Social 
Choice and Welfare (forthcoming). 
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Because the players rank the items exactly the same, all divisions are 
efficient, making the choice of a fairest one appear difficult. 
Only six divisions, however, are what Brams and Fishburn'7 call 
undoominated splits: 
(1, 2345); (12, 345); (13, 245); (14, 235); (I5, 234); (145, 23) 
These divisions are those in which, in the absence of information 
about preferences over subsets, either of the two allocations in each 
might be preferred by a player, making each undominated. All these 
divisions, therefore, are envy-possible. 
The Borda maximin divisions are (13, 245) and (14, 235), which 
give Borda scores of, respectively, [8, 7] and [7, 8] to the players. But 
neither division might be envy-free if, say, both players prefer alloca- 
tion 13 to 245 in the first and allocation 14 to 235 in the second-that 
is, both prefer the "same side" of each division. These preferences 
imply that both prefer allocation 12 to 345 in the second division, 
(12, 345), and allocation 145 to 23 in the sixth division, (145, 23), 
precluding these divisions, as well, from being envy-free. 
Thus, the preferences of A and B assumed above would eliminate 
four of the undominated splits from being envy-free, allowing the two 
remaining divisions to be so. For example, A might prefer allocation 
1 in the first division and allocation 15 in the fifth, whereas B might 
prefer the complements: allocation 2345 in the first, and allocation 
234 in the fifth. 
In none of our previous examples with envy-free divisions was such 
a division not Borda maximin. But as we have just illustrated, there 
may be several envy-free divisions, none of which is Borda maximin. 
This divergence points to the limitation of Borda maximin as a 
criterion for choosing divisions, because Borda scoring may not 
reflect the intensity of player preferences that can be better gleaned 
from player preferences over subsets. 
But we do not need to know player preferences over subsets to 
show that an envy-free division may not be Borda maximin: 
Example VIII: 
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
B: 5 8 1 2 6 7 3 4 9 
C: 3 4 9 1 2 5 6 7 8 
'7 "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Prefer- 
ences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and Equity," Social Choice andl Welfare, XVII, 
2 (February 2000): 247-67. 
This content downloaded from 129.59.110.106 on Thu, 20 Mar 2014 15:57:07 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
312 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
It is easy to see that division (127, 568, 349) is envy-free, but it gives 
a seventh-best item to A. By contrast, division (126, 587, 349) gives 
sixth-best items to A and B and the same 349 allocation to C. 
Because no other divisions (equal or unequal) give players lowest- 
ranked items that are as high as sixth-best, division (126, 578, 349) is 
maximin. But it is not envy-free: B may envy A, because she may prefer 
allocation 126 to 578, making this division envy-possible. 
The Borda scores of the envy-free division are [20, 22, 24], whereas 
those of the maximin division are [21, 21, 24], so the maximin 
division is also Borda maximin. Both the envy-free and maximin/ 
Borda maximin divisions have total Borda scores of 66, which is also 
the Borda maxsum in example VIII. 
This example illustrates what we think is our most striking paradox. 
Specificially, without any special assumptions about the preferences 
of the players for subsets of items, it shows the clash between envy- 
freeness and both maximin and Borda maximin. Furthermore, be- 
cause there are no unequal divisions in example VIII that satisfy any 
of our fairness criteria- or, for that matter, the Borda maxsum 
criterion-it highlights the difficulty of choosing a fairest allocation, 
even in the equal-division case: Should one help the worst-off, or 
avoid envy, when one cannot do both?'8 
18 This question is more fully explored in Brains and Daniel King, "Efficient Fair 
Division: Help the Worst Off or Avoid Envy?" (unpublished), in which it is shown 
not only that maximin and Borda maximin divisions may not be envy-free but also 
that all such divisions may actually ensure envy. To illustrate this conflict, consider 
the following example: 
A: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
B: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
C: 1 5 4 6 2 3 
There are four Borda maximin divisions-(14, 23, 56), (23, 14, 56), (13, 24, 56), 
(24, 13, 56), each giving a minimum Borda score of 8 to a player-which are also 
maximin divisions (a worst-off player receives a fourth-best item). In addition, there 
are two maximin divisions which are not Borda maximin divisions-(12, 34, 56), 
(34, 12, 56)-which also give a worst-off player a fourth-best item. All six divisions 
ensure envy: in each, one player prefers another player's two items to her own. This 
example demonstrates that maximin and Borda maximin divisions, rather than just 
preclude envy-freeness, may guarantee envy (that is, be envy-ensuring rather than 
just envy-possible, as in example VIII). Furthermore, unlike example II, in which 
the unique efficient maximin and Borda maximin division, (1, 3, 2), is also envy- 
ensuring, the present example involves each player's receiving two items, which one 
might think would be sufficient to allow a maximin or Borda maximin division to 
be envy-possible, if not envy-free. This, however, is not the case, underscoring the 
seriousness of the conflict among our fairness criteria. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The eight paradoxes pinpoint difficulties in dividing up indivisible 
items so that each player feels satisfied, in some sense, with her 
allocation. The first two paradoxes show that efficient and envy-free 
divisions may be incompatible because the only envy-free division 
may be inefficient, or there may be no envy-free division at all. 
Both of these paradoxes require at least three players.'9 When 
there are only two players, even when they rank items exactly the 
same, it turns out that efficient and envy-free divisions can always be 
found, except when the players have the same preferences over all 
subsets of items.20 
But the existence of even a unique efficient and envy-free division 
may not be chosen by the players for other reasons. In particular, 
such a division will not necessarily be selected when players vote for 
the division or divisions that they prefer. Also, a unique efficient and 
envy-free division will not necessarily be the division that maximizes 
the minimum rank of items that players receive, so the Rawlsian 
maximin criterion of making the worst-off player as well off as possi- 
ble may not single it out. 
As a way of measuring the value of allocations to find those divi- 
sions which are most egalitarian, especially in comparing equal and 
unequal divisions, we used Borda scoring based on player rankings of 
the items. We showed that a Borda maximin division may not be a 
Borda maxsum division, indicating the possible conflict between 
egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes. 
This difference may show up when there are as few as two players 
dividing up three items, making it impossible to divide the items 
equally between the players. But even when this is possible, unequal 
divisions of items may be the only ones that satisfy the Borda maximin 
criterion. While indicating a preference for this criterion over the 
Borda maxsum criterion when the two clash, we illustrated how 
Borda maximin divisions may fail badly in finding envy-free divisions. 
Indeed, there may be no overlap between Borda maximin and envy- 
free divisions. 
Our purpose is not just to indicate the pitfalls of fair division by 
exhibiting paradoxes that can occur. There are also opportunities, 
but these depend on the judicious application of selection criteria 
when not all criteria can be satisfied simultaneously. 
191 Edelman and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items among People with 
Similar Preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, XLI, 3 (May 2001): 327-47. 
20 Brams and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People 
with Identical Preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity." 
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Several recent papers have suggested constructive procedures for 
finding the most plausible candidates for fair division of a set of 
indivisible items.21 We find this direction promising, because it is 
potentially applicable to ameliorating, if not solving, practical prob- 
lems of fair division-ranging from the splitting of the marital prop- 
erty in a divorce to determining who gets what in an international 
dispute. While some conflicts are ineradicable, as the paradoxes 
demonstrate, the trade-offs that best resolve these conflicts are by no 
means evident. 
STEVEN J. BRAMS 
New York University 
PAUL H. EDELMAN 
Vanderbilt University 
PETER C. FISHBURN 
AT&T Shannon Laboratory 
21 Brams and Fishburn, "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People 
with Identical Preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity"; Edelman 
and Fishburn; Brams, Edelman, and Fishburn; Brams and King; and Dorothea 
Herreiner and Clemens Puppe, "A Simple Procedure for Finding Equitable Allo- 
cations of Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming). 
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